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Abstract: People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and 
researchers have pointed to both "intentions" and incentives as sources of this effect. This 
paper reports data from a novel experimental design aimed at determining the relative 
importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior in a 
personal exchange environment. Subjects play one-shot investment games in pairs. 
Investors send an amount to trustees and request a return on this investment and, in some 
treatments, are given the option to threaten sanctions to enforce this return request. The 
decisions of trustees who face credible threats intentionally imposed (or not) by their 
investors are compared to the decisions of trustees who face threats randomly imposed 
(or not) by nature. When not threatened, trustees typically decide to return a positive 
amount that is less than the investor requested. When threatened with sanctions this 
decision becomes least common. In particular, under severe sanction threats most trustees 
return the desired amount, while under weak threats the most common decision is to 
return nothing. Critically, these results do not depend on whether the trustee is threatened 
intentionally by their investor or randomly by nature: trustees who are threatened with 
weak sanctions are significantly more likely to provide a zero return to their investors, 
even when they know that their investors had no role in imposing the threat. Our findings 
lend support to the view that credible threats of sanctions generate a “cognitive shift” that 
crowds-out norm-based motivations and increases the likelihood of income-maximizing 
behavior. 
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  1I. Introduction 
Sanctions are often written into incomplete contracts in an effort to encourage 
cooperation. Especially when information is asymmetric, the threat of sanctions might 
discourage self-interested actors from cheating or making other opportunistic decisions. 
In many cases, acts that constitute "cooperation" are explicitly described. For example, 
legislation might require firms to reduce effluents to a certain level, and stipulate that not 
doing so would result in a known monetary forfeiture. The threat might be successful in 
that firms might cooperate and reduce effluents as directed. Alternatively, the threat 
might fail in any number of ways. For example, firms might reduce effluents but still 
produce more than directed. Or firms might make no reduction efforts at all, or even 
produce more than they had previously. This paper uses a novel experiment to examine 
the conditions under which credible threats of sanctions are likely to promote cooperation 
and, when not, how they are likely to fail. 
A large literature in both psychology and economics makes clear that “intentions” 
and “incentives” are two key factors in determining sanctions’ behavioral effects (see, 
e.g., Yamagishi, 1986, 1988; Ostrom, et al., 1992; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Fehr and 
Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr and List, 2004; Dickinson, 2001; Andreoni, et al, 2003; Bewley, 
1999; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a). In general, intentions and incentives are 
distinguished by the fact that intentions involve personalized rules by men, while 
incentives involve impersonal rules by law. Here, “incentives” will refer narrowly to the 
pecuniary tradeoffs a sanctioning mechanism creates. “Intention” effects will be those 
that stem from a trustee’s belief regarding an investor’s motivation for threatening (or not 
threatening) a sanction. For example, a trustee might become angry at an investor who 
makes a threat if he interprets it as a signal of mistrust, and consequently act in a way that 
does not maximize his or her earnings.    
Although it is widely agreed that both intentions and incentives can matter (e.g., 
Camerer, 2003, highlights the potential importance of intentions in a wide variety of 
game-theoretic contexts), there has not previously appeared any systematic evidence on 
their relative importance in enforcing cooperation through punishment in trust 
environments. Given the ubiquitous use of sanction threats in such environments (e.g., 
employer and employee, or principal and agent), a deeper understanding of the sources of 
  2their behavioral consequences is evidently important. We present here a novel 
experimental design to investigate the relative behavioral effects of punishment intentions 
and punishment mechanism incentives in a gift exchange context. Moreover, our design 
allows us to distinguish “types” of non-cooperative behavior, and we draw inferences 
with respect to the way non-cooperative decision making differs among various incentive 
and intention conditions.  
We extend an experimental design used in a study of sanctions by Fehr and 
Rockenbach (2003); (see also Fehr and List, 2004). Broadly, this design is an 
“investment” game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) where an investor sends an 
amount to a trustee, that amount is tripled by the experimenter, and then the trustee sends 
some fraction of the tripled amount back to the investor. Like Fehr and Rockenbach 
(2003), we augment this environment by allowing investors to threaten trustees credibly 
with sanctions if an insufficient amount is back-transferred to the investor. Our design is 
novel in that we compare outcomes in that “intentions” treatment to a new treatment 
where the sanction is randomly assigned to trustees by nature. In this way are able to 
separate cleanly intention effects from incentive effects of sanctions. 
Our design also distinguishes between “weak” and “severe” punishment incentives. 
In particular, the ratio of the sanction to the back-transfer request is a natural measure of 
the sanction’s severity. When the threatened sanction is “large” relative to the back-
transfer request we say that the sanction is severe, and otherwise we say it is weak.  We 
obtain observations on both cases by holding exogenously fixed the sanction’s amount, 
while the back-transfer request varies according to first-movers decisions. In this way we 
obtain substantial variation in the severity of the threatened sanction, and this variation 
identifies the effect of the incentive’s severity on trustees’ decisions. 
We focus almost entirely on cases where the investor requests a “fair” backtransfer, 
where by fair we mean that investor requested at most 2/3 of the tripled transfer amount. 
(If 2/3 of the tripled amount is returned, then both the investor and trustee earn the same 
amount in the experiment.) One reason is that many policy relevant sanctioning schemes 
are at least perceived as enforcing fair outcomes, so knowing more about this case is 
important. Moreover, as a practical matter, most of the investors in our design requested 
fair back-transfers. Consequently, collecting enough data to appropriately control for the 
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highly burdensome. At the same time, the unfair effect is clearly important: we find that 
trustees behave statistically significantly differently when faced with an unfair 
backtransfer requests than they do otherwise.   
Our design turns out to have surprising power: we both clarify and significantly 
extend Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) and others’ related findings. When not threatened, 
trustees typically decide to return a positive amount that is less than the investor 
requested. When threatened with sanctions this decision becomes least common. In 
particular, under severe sanction threats most trustees return the desired amount, while 
under weak threats the most common decision is to return nothing.
1 Moreover, we were 
surprised to find that these results hold both when the sanction is threatened intentionally 
by the investor as well as when it is threatened randomly by nature: a trustee is more 
likely to return nothing to his or her investor after having been threatened with a weak 
sanction, regardless of whether the investor played any role in determining that sanction.  
This paper is in five sections. The next gives additional background on research in 
psychology and economics on sanctions. The third and fourth sections detail our design 
and results, respectively. The fifth section is a concluding discussion.   
 
II. Background 
In this section we describe some of what is known about the way incentives and 
intentions affect the efficacy of sanctions. The literature in this area is vast: see Fehr and 
Falk (2002) for a comprehensive survey of this topic. We also briefly discuss previous 
research on non-cooperative decision making. We point out that, to the best of our 
knowledge, ours is the first attempt to compare and contrast the distributions of “types” 




                                                 
1 Other studies have found similar all-or-nothing behavior (see, e.g., Dickinson, 2001; Fehr and Gächter, 
2002; Tyran and Feld, 2004). However, we are not aware of any study that distinguishes the relative 
importance of intention from incentive effects in these all-or-nothing decisions, nor have these studies 
recognized the significance of weak and severe punishment in affecting the distribution of returns.  
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It is useful to think of incentive effects as stemming from a sanction threat imposed by 
nature, rather than by another person. Standard economic arguments show that incentives 
can be effective in enforcing cooperation. In particular, threats of sanctions can make a 
non-cooperative action’s expected net benefit negative, so that income-maximizing 
agents will not take the action. Many have also pointed out that incentives can reduce 
cooperation (see, e.g. Kreps, 1997, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997, Benabou and Tirole, 
2003, Fehr and Falk, 2002).  An important example is Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b), 
who report that when subjects were offered small monetary incentives to perform a task, 
they performed more poorly than those who were offered no compensation (but not as 
well as those who were offered more substantial compensation). These results, they argue, 
suggest that monetary rewards can interfere with an intrinsic desire to perform a task well. 
  This line of reasoning is familiar to psychologists, who have long argued that 
pecuniary incentives can make people less interested in desirable conduct for its own 
sake (see. e.g. Deci, et al, 1999; Lepper and Greene, 1978).  The underlying idea is that 
individuals are likely to attribute their actions to intrinsic motivation when there is no 
external incentive present, but to discount this motive when a pecuniary reward is offered 
for actions. Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) proceed in a similar spirit, and argue that 
reward and sanctioning systems can increase the likelihood that a cognitive “business” 
frame, rather than an “ethical” frame, will be used to make decisions.  
  Overall then, previous research on incentives reveals that sanctioning mechanisms 
can increase cooperation by changing the payoff structure, but also include the downside 
risk that norm-based cooperation can be decreased due to a shift in the cognitive decision 
frame. This has several relevant implications for this paper. First, when a threatened 
sanction is severe (in the sense that the cost of the sanction greatly exceeds the benefit of 
non-cooperation), the incentive effect implies that people will avoid punishment and 
cooperate perfectly. Second, when the threatened sanction is weak, the incentive-driven 
cognitive-shift will lead people to take the action that maximizes their own earnings, even 
if it is highly non-cooperative. Finally, in the absence of threat-based incentives, subjects 
will make their decision within more of an ethical context and complete defection will be 
less frequent than in the weak sanction case.   
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II. 2. Intention Effects 
When a credible threat is endogenous, in the sense that one person chooses to threaten 
another, both the incentives of the mechanism and also the intentions that underlie the 
threat can affect behavior. Indeed, humans seem strongly disposed to infer intentionality 
when understanding others’ actions (see e.g., Gibbs, 1999). For example, imposing 
sanctions can be seen as a signal of distrust (see, e.g. Fehr and Falk, 2002), or might 
create a hostile atmosphere (Bewley, 1999), and consequently reduce cooperation. 
Similarly, intentional acts of helping are more likely to be reciprocated than unintentional 
ones, and intentional acts of aggression are responded to more often than unintentional 
acts (see, e.g., Greenberg and Frisch, 1972; Gordon and Bowlby, 1989; Blount, 1995; 
Offerman, 2002).  
Many economic models now include intention effects. Rabin (1993) is an early 
approach to incorporating the perceived kindness of another into one’s own preference 
structure. Another nice example is Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998), who develop a 
theory of reciprocity for extensive form games. A substantial amount of experimental 
research also suggests that intentions can play an important role in shaping decisions (see 
e.g., McCabe, Rigdon and Smith, 2003; Fehr, Gächter, 2000; Nelson, 2002; and Charness, 
2002).
2   
Previous theoretical and experimental research suggests that trustees’ decisions in 
our experiment could be affected by their perception of investors’ intentions. For 
example, if investors who threaten sanctions are perceived as being unkind or 
distrusting
3,
 then the intention effect will lead to less trustee cooperation in this case than 
when otherwise identical sanctions are threatened by nature. Moreover, intentions might 
be particularly salient, and lead to relatively less cooperation than when punishment is 
not intentionally imposed, in cases where an investor threatens severe sanctions. Note this 
stands in sharp contrast to the incentive effect of severe sanctions. Intentions, of course, 
can also have a positive effect on cooperation. In particular, investors who choose not to 
                                                 
2 Bolton, et al. (1998) report data from a design where intentions do not seem to affect behavior. 
3 Charness and Dufwenberg (2004) suggest an alternative source of intention effects. Loosely speaking, 
their argument is that investors who threaten sanctions might be perceived by trustees as expecting a low 
return, and that trustees would therefore feel less guilty about providing a low return.  
  6sanction might be perceived as “nice” and be relatively highly rewarded for this. Our 
experimental design provides transparent inference with respect to the way intentions 
influence the reaction to threats, or non-threats, of both severe and weak sanctions. 
 
II.3.   Non-cooperative Decision Making 
Credible threats of sanctions, both in the laboratory and naturally occurring world, 
typically stipulate that a particular action is cooperative, while any other action is non-
cooperative and subject to sanctions. In the event that a person chooses not to cooperate 
under such a threat, what sort of non-cooperative decision is likely to be made? How do 
non-cooperative decisions under threats compare to non-cooperative decisions when no 
threats are present? Do the answers to these questions depend on whether the threat is 
intentional? Our design sheds light on these questions. 
  Much experimental research on cooperation uses extensive form games that 
restrict subjects’ action spaces to two alternatives: one cooperative and one not (see, 
McCabe, Rigdon and Smith, 2003). Clearly, while such designs have the twin advantages 
of being clean and providing relatively easily interpretable results, they also cannot 
inform the above questions. Moreover, even when the design can potentially inform the 
nature of non-cooperation, studies have typically not included the randomization 
treatments necessary to inform intention effects (see, e.g., Fehr et. al. 1997).  
  The important paper by Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) is an example of this point. 
Although their design is in principle capable of distinguishing types of non-cooperative 
decisions under different incentive structures, it is not their paper’s point to do so. In fact, 
there are at least four natural “types” of decisions that are available to trustees in their 
design. They can (i) send nothing back (investors lose all the endowment); (ii) send back 
a positive amount less than the transfer amount (investors lose some of the endowment); 
(iii) send back at least the transfer amount but less than the requested amount (investors 
earn at least the original endowment); (iv) send back at least the requested amount 
(investors get at least what they want). Note that the first three are non-cooperative in 
different ways, while the last is cooperative. In this paper we provide new evidence on 
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influenced by sanctions with various incentive and intention structures.
4   
 
III. Experiment Design 
Because our experiment is closely connected to Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) (henceforth, 
FR), we begin this section with a discussion of their procedures. Doing this allows us to 
distinguish our work from theirs, and to indicate how our methods substantially sharpen 
our understanding of the behaviors observed in both their environment and our own. 
    
III.1.   Fehr and Rockenbach’s Study 
FR study sanction effects in a modified investment game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 
1995). In their “trust” treatment, both the investor and the trustee receive an endowment 
of ten money units (MUs). The investor sends some, all or none of his endowment to the 
trustee, and the experimenter triples any amount sent. In addition, the investor specifies 
the amount, between zero and the entire tripled amount, that she would like the trustee to 
return. After seeing the tripled amount sent and the desired back-transfer, the trustee 
sends some, all or none of the tripled amount back to the investor. The investor earns his 
endowment of 10 MUs, minus anything transferred to the trustee, plus any back-transfer 
amount. The trustee earns the endowment of 10 MUs, plus the tripled transfer amount, 
minus any amount back-transferred.  
FR study behavior in a second treatment, the “incentive” condition, which is 
identical to the trust baseline except that the investor can now choose whether to commit 
to imposing a fine of a fixed four MUs on the trustee if less than the desired amount is 
returned. Both subjects are aware that this fine, if due, does not accrue to the investor but 
rather to the experimenter’s research budget. When the trustee makes his decision in the 
incentive condition he knows which sanction option his investor has chosen.  
FR’s major finding is that, on average, trustees’ back-transfers were highest when 
the investor voluntarily refrained from the fine in the incentive condition, and lowest 
                                                 
4 The fact that we study a one-shot environment of course limits the amount of type classification that one 
can do. Cooperative types have been studied in dynamic environments by Houser and Kurzban (2002) and 
Kurzban and Houser (2004), among others. A robust statistical procedure for behavioral type classification 
has been provided by Houser et. al. (2004).  
  8when the investor imposed the fine. The mean back-transfer in the trust condition fell 
between the two means in the incentive condition. Hence, FR provided evidence that the 
use of sanctions can reduce cooperative behavior.
5  
FR’s experiment incorporates both the intention to punish and a punishment 
incentive mechanism, but their design does not distinguish these two effects. 
Consequently, one cannot know how much of the reduction in cooperation is due to the 
punishment incentive itself, and what amount is due to the intention to use this incentive.
6  
 
III.2   Design 
Our design enables us to examine the effect of sanctions when they are assigned 
randomly to trustees, and in a way that eliminates investor intention effects. Intuitively, 
comparing the condition without punishment intentions to the condition with punishment 
intentions enables inferences regarding punishment intention effects. 
 
Treatments 
Figure A describes our “intentions” treatment. Note that it corresponds exactly to FR’s 
“incentive” condition. 
                                                              Investor 
                                        T,D, P                                      T, D,NP 
                                   Trustee                                         Trustee 
          BT<D                                     BT≥D                    BT     
      10-T+BT                                        10-T+BT           10-T+BT 
      10+3T-BT-C                                  10+3T-BT         10+3T-BT 
Figure A: Intention treatment  
T—investor’s transfer; D—investor’s desired back transfer; P—threaten punishment; NP—not 
threaten punishment; BT—Trustee’s backtransfer; C—amount of fine (payoff cut) if BT is less than D. 
                                                 
5 Fehr and List (2004) find similar results using the same design with a novel subject pool. 
6 Note also that in FR’s data it turns out that investors who choose to fine also send less, on average, than 
those who choose not to fine. Because all investors start with the same endowment, this means that 
investors who fine send a smaller percentage of their endowment than those who don’t. FR’s main result is 
that if the fine was imposed the trustees paid back a smaller percentage of the tripled investment than if the 
fine was not imposed (30.3% as compared to 47.6%.) From FR’s design, we are unable to know how much 
of this difference might be unrelated to incentive or intention effects, and rather simply due to differences 
in the percentage of the investors’ endowments’ received by trustees in the two cases. We control for this. 
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In this treatment subjects are paired with each other anonymously. Both investors and 
trustees are endowed with $10 at the beginning of the experiment. The investor first 
decides how much to transfer to her trustee (T), how much to request as a backtransfer 
(D), and whether to threaten punishment (P or NP). With this information in hand, the 
trustee then decides how much to transfer back to the investor. If the trustee returns less 
than the investor requested, and if the investor chose to impose the conditional payoff cut, 
then the final earnings of the trustee are reduced by $4, and this amount is known by both 
the investor and the trustee. Both the trustee and investor know that, if it is due, this $4 
sanction does not go to the investor, but instead remains in the experimenter’s research 
budget. 
Our second treatment, the “random” treatment, is described by Figure B.  
            Investor 
                                                          T, D           
                                               N 
                                               P        (1/2)      (1/2)       NP 
                                   Trustee                                         Trustee 
          BT<D                                     BT≥D                    BT     
      10-T+BT                                        10-T+BT           10-T+BT 
      10+3T-BT-C                                  10+3T-BT         10+3T-BT 
Figure B. random treatment 
 
In the “random” treatment, whether a given trustee is subject to a sanction threat is 
determined through a transparent randomization procedure. We ran each of these sessions 
with multiples of four subjects, which allowed us to ensure that exactly half of the 
trustees could be randomly assigned to the punishment condition, and the other half to the 
non-punishment condition. The assignment of subjects to conditions was performed in 
front of the subjects, and involved simply drawing envelopes from a box.  
The goal of our random treatment was to eliminate any possibility that trustees 
could believe investors had punishment intentions. Our approach to this was to give 
investors in the random treatment absolutely no information about sanctions that the 
  10trustees might face, and to tell trustees that this is the case (this is indicated by the dotted 
line in Fig. B). We believe that blinding investors to the possibility that the trustee will be 
sanctioned is necessary for clean and compelling separation of intention and incentive 
effects. In particular, if investors knew there was a possibility that trustees could be 
sanctioned, then trustees who are randomly assigned to the sanction condition might 
believe (perhaps appropriately) that their investors “expected” or “hoped” that would 
happen. Taking this view might be particularly likely if, as sometimes happens, the 
investor sent one dollar and asked for all three dollars back. It seems likely that trustees’ 
decisions could be affected by such an intention attribution, and this would act to 
confound (to an unknown extent) our ability to separate intention and incentive effects.  
An obvious consequence of blinding investors to the sanctioning procedures is 
that, while they are of course not deceived, they also do not have full information about 
the way trustees’ payoffs are determined. This has the usual consequence that we lose 
control over what investors believe regarding trustees’ earnings and the way that might 
affect their own earnings. Accordingly, interpreting investor behavior becomes difficult. 
Consequently, we draw no inferences regarding motivations for investor behavior. Our 
conclusions are based entirely on the behaviors of trustees.  
Although investors in the random treatment are not aware of the sanctions at the 
time they make their decisions, the sanctioning procedure is explained to them at the end 
of each session, and at that time they are also informed of the condition to which their 
matched trustee was randomly assigned. This is done to ensure maximal symmetry with 
the intention treatment. In particular, trustees in the intention treatment know that their 
investors know whether they have been assigned to the sanction condition. So, in the 
random treatment trustees are informed that the investors will be told about the 
sanctioning procedure and their matched trustee’s assignment at the session’s end. 
 An attempt at symmetry is also the reason that we did not run “sanction 
everybody” or “sanction nobody” treatments, which is a common suggestion offered to 
us when presenting this paper.  Note that in the intention treatment there are three pieces 
of information simultaneously revealed to trustees: the transfer amount, the desired back-
transfer and the punishment condition. There is uncertainty about all three pieces of 
information up to the point that the investors’ decisions are revealed to them. In contrast, 
  11in a “sanction everybody” treatment, for example, all trustees would know from the 
beginning that they will face the sanction incentive. They will learn only two new pieces 
of information directly prior to making their decision. The extent to which this might 
matter is an empirical question; to us the important point is simply that it might. Although 
we conduct the randomization in a transparent way in front of the subjects, the 
assignments generated by the randomization are revealed to them at the same time, and in 
the same way, as occurs in the incentive treatment.  
  To summarize, the salient difference between our random and intention 
treatments is that investors cannot have any punishment intentions in the former, and it is 
not reasonable to expect that trustees might assign punishment intentions to them. 
Consequently, any differences in the behaviors of trustees between these two treatments 
can be cleanly attributed to differences in investors’ sanction intentions.  Moreover, as 
there are no punishment intentions in the random treatment, we can study the punishment 
incentive effect within this treatment by examining how the trustees in the punishment 
group behave in relation to those trustees assigned to the non-punishment group.  
 
III.3 Procedures 
A total of 532 subjects participated in this experiment. 149 pairs played in intention 
treatment and 117 pairs played in random treatment
7. All subjects were recruited from 
George Mason University’s general student population, using standard recruiting 
procedures in place at the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.  Subjects 
earned a $5 show up bonus for arriving to the lab on time. Subjects earned E$ during the 
experiment, and at the end of the experiment the E$ were exchanged for dollars at the 
rate of 1 to 1.   
Our specific procedures are detailed in the instructions found in Appendix B. Key 
aspects of our procedures include the following. Each treatment included just one game 
(one decision by the investor and one decision by the trustee), and subjects knew that this 
would be the case. All treatments were run by hand, were single blind and began with 
each subject being randomly assigned to one of two roles, “investor” or “trustee.” 
                                                 
7 In the random treatment, there were three investors who transferred zero and consequently, asked for zero 
back.  Because the trustee has no decision to make in these cases, we drop these data from our analysis, 
leaving 114 observations in the random treatment. 
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room and trustees (Actor 2 in the instructions) another. After they were separated each 
trustee was randomly and anonymously matched with one investor. The investors wrote 
their decisions on cards that were then delivered by the experimenter to the trustees. The 
trustees wrote down their decisions on the same cards, and those decisions were delivered 
back to the investor by the experimenter. Earnings were calculated, subjects were paid 
and the experiment concluded. On average, subjects were in the lab for about 90 minutes 
and earned about $15 in addition to the show-up bonus. 
It is worthwhile to reiterate the procedures we used to eliminate investors’ 
punishment intentions. In the random treatment, investors were not informed that some 
trustees would be threatened with sanctions until after the trustees’ decisions were 
complete, and trustees were made aware that this was the case. Also, the randomization 
procedure used to assign trustees to the sanction condition was highly transparent. It 
involved blindly choosing envelopes out of a box, in front of the trustees, and assigning 
the sanction condition based on that draw. Trustees were attentive to the randomization 
process. They clearly understood that the sanction condition to which they were assigned 
was determined using a fair randomization procedure controlled by the experimenter, and 
that investors were not at all connected to that procedure. 
 
IV. Results 
IV.1  The Data 
Table 1 provides aggregate information on the decisions of investors and trustees. Panel 
A describes the results for the cases with “fair” backtransfer requests, where we define 
fair to mean any request that is less than or equal to 2/3 of the tripled amount.
8 Panel B 
provides information on the relatively small number of cases where the request was 
                                                 
8 The distribution of investor decisions should be interpreted with caution. Following a treatment reported 
by Fehr and Rockenbach (2003), we provided investors (not trustees) in all of our treatments with a graph 
describing the FR (2003) results (of course excluding results related to punishment in the “random” 
treatments.)  Our goal was to study behavior under “fair” back-transfer requests, and we conjectured that 
providing (only) investors with the FR (2003) results could act to increase the likelihood of fair requests. 
While FR (2003) found no statistically significant effect of their information sheet, we do not have the 
contrast available to assess its impact. 
 
  13unfair. The fair and unfair data sets are statistically significantly different, especially 
when punishment is imposed, and cannot be pooled. This is easily seen by comparing, for 
example, the percent of the tripled transfer amount that trustees return. When the request 
is fair and a sanction is randomly imposed about 32% is returned, while in the unfair case 
about 12% is returned, and the difference is statistically significant (p<0.05). Our main 
interest in this paper is in fair backtransfer requests and we focus the first three parts of 
this section, and most of our conclusions, on those data. We briefly discuss the unfair 
backtransfer requests at the end of this section.  
  Table 1(A) shows there are a total of 96 trustees in the incentive treatment who 
receive a fair backtransfer request, and 44 of these trustees are randomly assigned to the 
sanction condition. In the intention treatment, 122 trustees were asked to return less than 
or equal to the equal-split amount, of whom 62 face the conditional payoff cut. The 
aggregate data does not suggest much difference between the intention and incentive 
treatments. In both cases, under threats of punishment trustees return about 32% of the 
tripled investment amount.  
  To investigate whether there are effects stemming from a sanction’s severity we 
say a sanction threat is “severe” when an investors’ request is less than 8E$, and we say 
that a threatened sanction is “weak” otherwise.  In the random treatment, about 42% of 
trustees who do not face threats of sanctions are asked to return less than 8E$, while that 
number is 45% for trustees assigned to the conditional payoff cut.  In the intention 
treatment those same numbers are 42% and 47% for the no-threat and threat cases, 
respectively.  
 
IV.2. Intentions, Incentives and Return Amounts 
To learn about sanction intention effects, we must control for other potential effects on 
trustees’ decisions. The trustee receives three messages: a transfer amount, a desired 
back-transfer and whether a sanction has been threatened (either by the investor or 
nature). Our strategy is to model trustees’ decisions as a function of those three messages 
and an error component. In all cases, we assume the error component is independent 
across subjects in different experimental sessions, but potentially correlated among 
subjects within the same experimental session.  
  14We begin by investigating the way in which these signals affect the percentage of 
the tripled amount (sent by the investor) that is sent back by the trustee. Using 
percentages provides a first control for the effect of the transferred amount. The 
percentage amount returned can itself, however, be affected by the transfer amount. As 
we argued in section III.1 above, trustees might "percentage match", in which case the 
percentage of the tripled amount that they return would increase in the percentage of the 
investor's endowment that was sent. Our analysis controls for this effect by including a 
dummy for whether the investor's transfer was high (four or more). We chose four 
because it is equal to the amount of the sanction. Our results are robust to changes in that 
number, or to replacing the dummy with the actual transfer amount. 
It is easy to see that the effect of the sanction might depend on the amount of the 
desired backtransfer. Consider, for example, the case where an investor sends two, 
desires a backtransfer of three, and chooses to punish (i.e. punishment is severe). A 
trustee who returns less than three is sanctioned by four, and consequently has a very 
strong incentive to cooperate. On the other hand, an investor who sends ten, desires a 
backtransfer of 20 and threatens a (weak) sanction places the trustee in a very different 
situation. In this case a completely noncooperative trustee, i.e. return nothing, will earn 
16 more than a trustee who returns the investor's desired amount. We control for this 
effect by interacting dummies that specify whether punishment was chosen intentionally 
or randomly, and whether the desired backtransfer amount was eight or more (high 
request), or less than eight (low request). The use of eight as the cutoff point is obviously 
arbitrary, but was guided by the fact that eight is double the sanction amount. Intuitively, 
the cost of cooperation might begin to seem large when the amount that must be returned 
is more than twice the sanction amount. Our results are robust to smaller or larger cutoff 
values, and can be obtained from the authors on request.  
Table 2 provides the results of an OLS regression (allowing for correlated error-
components within sessions) of the percentage of tripled amount returned on the 
regressors described above. In particular, the nine regressors include a dummy for 
whether the investment amount was high (greater than four) and eight terms determined 
by interacting decisions to punish and not punish, randomly or intentionally, with the 
high and low request conditions. We report OLS results because they are easy to interpret. 
  15The results are not substantively changed by running a Tobit that accounts for the fact 
that returned amounts are censored at 0% and 100% (in fact there are no cases where the 
entire tripled amount is returned).  
From Table 2 one sees that the R-squared for our simple specification is 0.59, 
suggesting that our model provides a reasonable fit to the data. The coefficient of the 
transfer amount dummy is unexpectedly negative, but rather small and statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that transfer effects are adequately controlled by using 
percentage of tripled amount returned as the dependent variable. Note that all of the 
coefficients involving punishment in Table 2 are positive.  
Casual observation of the coefficient estimates in Table 2 reveals that coefficients 
on four analogous random and intention conditions tend to be quite similar. A 
straightforward way to provide evidence on punishment intention effects is to test jointly 
the four restrictions that each intention coefficient is equal to its corresponding random 
coefficient.  That is, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient on intention punish is equal 
to the coefficient on random punish, and the coefficient on intention no punish is equal to 
that on random no punish, and so on. The alternative hypothesis is that the coefficients in 
at least one pair take different values. This test is unable to reject the null hypothesis 
(F(4,35)=0.22, p-value=0.93). This provides strong evidence that punishment threatened 
by investors does not affect trustees' returns differently than threats imposed by nature.  
On the other hand, an analogous test for the effect of punishment (that is, random 
punishment equals random no punishment, and so on for each of the three remaining 
pairs) provides some evidence against the null hypothesis that mean returns by trustees 
are not affected by the presence of punishment (F(4,35)=2.23, p-value=0.09). Moreover, 
the results of the test are stronger if we restrict attention to only the two pairs of low 
request coefficients (F(2,35)=4.36, p-value=0.02). This provides evidence that threats of 
sanctions interact with the request amount to influence trustees' decisions.  
Figure 1 summarizes these findings by plotting the percentage of tripled amount 
returned against the amount sent for each of the eight conditions of interest (e.g., random 
threatened high request, intention threatened high request, and so on.) The legend to 
Figure 1 also details the number of trustees observed in each of these eight cases. It is 
clear from casual observation that neither the transfer amount nor intentions have much 
  16of an affect on mean returns. On the other hand, there is evidence of sanction effects, and 
evidence supporting an interaction effect between the sanction and the request. 
Because we have found no evidence of intention effects, we proceed with our 
analysis of return decisions by pooling the random and intention data, so that the eight 
cells analyzed above collapse to four. The resulting data are described in Figures 2 and 3, 
which provide greater detail on the way threats influence trustees’ returns. Consider first 
Figure 2. This figure provides a histogram of the percentage of tripled amount returned, 
in the threat and no threat conditions, when the desired backtransfer request is low (less 
than eight). The average percent of tripled amount returned is higher when the trustee is 
threatened with punishment (43.4 vs. 26.0, p=0.002). More striking, however, is that the 
distribution under no threat as rather flat, while the distribution under punishment threats 
has a "U" shape. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test finds no support for the null hypothesis 
that the distributions are identical (p=0.0). A reason is that the two distributions have 
statistically significantly different standard deviations: 30.4 under punishment threats as 
compared to 22.7 when punishment is not threatened (F(49,47)=1.79, p=0.02). 
Figure 3 provides the same type of information for the two high request cells. In 
this case the mean of the punishment threats distribution (22.0) lies below the mean of the 
no punish threats distribution (29.5), although the difference is not statistically significant. 
Again, however, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test finds evidence that the distributions are not 
the same (p=0.01) and again this is reflected in differences between the two distributions' 
standard deviations. Under threats of punishment, the standard deviation of 27.8, while it 
is 23.6 when punishment is not threatened (F(57,65)=1.38, p=0.10).  
In the next section we examine the source of the spread in returns that occurs 
when punishment is threatened. We specify and estimate a multinomial choice model in 
order to provide evidence that, when threatened with punishment, trustees tend either to 
return the entire amount that the investor requested or to return nothing. Said another way, 
trustees are not likely to return only some of the desired amount when they have been 
threatened with sanctions, and this is true regardless of whether the threat is intentional. 
 
 
IV.3. Sanctions and Non-Cooperation 
  17Investors threaten trustees with sanctions in an effort to encourage them to return the 
desired back transfer. We call trustees “cooperative” if they return at least the requested 
amount, and non-cooperative otherwise. We use this definition because we analyze only 
those cases where the investor requested at most half of the pair’s aggregate earnings. To 
provide less than an equal split, when an equal split was explicitly requested, is 
reasonably viewed as (at least) weakly non-cooperative.  In this section we present the 
results from two multinomial choice models of trustee decision making. The first model, 
which includes a relatively course action space but a rich set of explanatory variables, 
allows inference with respect to how a trustee's decision to send some, all or none of the 
desired back transfer is affected by intentionally or randomly imposed sanctions. As 
above, we find that trustees’ decisions are statistically identical in both the intention and 
random conditions. Consequently, we estimate a second model that eliminates the 
intention variables but refines the action space.  
We begin by defining a trustee's choice set so that it includes three mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive alternatives: cooperate completely (send at least as much as the 
investor requested) and two non-cooperative options: defect completely (send nothing), 
or weakly non-cooperate by sending a positive amount that is less than the requested 
amount. As described formally in Appendix A, we adopt a random utility specification to 
analyze these data.
9 This specification implies that the utility associated with each 
alternative depends on the nine explanatory variables discussed above and an alternative 
and subject specific error component which might be correlated among individuals within 
the same experimental session. We assume that each subject chooses the alternative 
associated with his or her highest subjective utility value. We assume a structure for the 
error components that implies choices can be characterized by a multinomial logit.       
 
IV.3.a. Three-alternative model 
Table 3 presents the multinomial logit estimates, where weak non-cooperation is taken as 
the baseline. Multinomial logit coefficients are difficult to interpret, but casual inspection 
of their values quickly reveals that the transfer amount is not statistically significant in 
                                                 
9 We point out in Appendix A that it is inappropriate to use an ordered specification to analyze this data 
(e.g., ordered logit or ordered probit). 
  18either equation, and analogous random and intention coefficient estimates are similar 
relative to the standard errors of the estimates. In fact, a joint test of the null hypothesis 
that, across the eight pairs of analogous terms, the random and intention coefficients are 
identical cannot be rejected at standard significance levels (chisq(8)=6.1, p=0.63). This is 
convergent evidence that intentional threats by investors do not change trustees’ 
decisions in comparison to cases where a sanction is threatened randomly by nature.  
On the other hand, a joint test of sanction effects (e.g., random punish = random 
no punish, and so on) clearly indicates that trustees' decisions to cooperate or defect are 
statistically significantly affected by credible threats of (intentional and random) 
sanctions (chisq(8)=38.6, p<0.01).    
Table 4 provides estimation results for the three-alternative model where the 
statistically insignificant transfer and intention variables have been omitted, and Figure 4 
describes the data that underlie that estimation. The figure shows, for each of the four 
cells, the fraction of subjects that cooperated, weakly non-cooperated and completely 
defected. (Recall that the number of observations, broken down by treatment, is provided 
in the legend to Figure 1.) When sanctions are not threatened, the most common trustee 
decision is to send some, but not all, of the amount that the investor requested. Such 
returns occur more than half of the time, and include 57% and 51% of all decisions in the 
low and high desired back transfer cases, respectively. Under sanction threats this weakly 
non-cooperative behavior becomes least common. About a fourth of trustees weakly non-
cooperate under weak threats, but only 8% choose this option under severe threats.  
The change in the frequency of non-cooperation underlies the impressive 
differences between the "threatened" and "not threatened" distributions described by 
Figure 4. The distribution in both of the "not threatened" cells has an inverted "U" shape, 
while in both "threatened" cells the shape of the distribution is the inverse. In fact, there 
is not a statistically significant difference between the two distributions in the "not 
threatened" cells. However, there is a statistically significant difference between any two 
other distributions in the remaining five pairwise comparisons (p<0.01 in all cases.) In 
particular, the change in shape from "U" to its inverse is statistically significant. 
Although both weak and severe sanctions reduce weak non-cooperation, the effect 
of that reduction is different between the two cases. Threats of severe sanctions tend to 
  19increase the number of cooperative decisions by trustees. When the desired back transfer 
is low and sanctions are not threatened we find that about 23% of the trustees return the 
amount that the investor requested. Under threats of severe sanctions the fraction of 
trustees who cooperate triples to 69%, and this difference is statistically significant (two 
sided, two-sample t-test with unequal variances, p=0.0).
10 Note that this effect is almost 
exclusively due to changes in the frequency of weak non-cooperation: the frequency of 
defection is nearly unchanged between the two treatments, at 19% and 22% in the no 
threat and threat cases, respectively. 
When the threatened sanction is weak, the behavioral effect works in the opposite 
direction with the fraction of trustees who return nothing to their investor nearly doubling, 
from 25% without sanction threats to 46% under threats of weak sanctions. This increase 
is statistically significant (p=0.02) and is again primarily due to changes in the frequency 
of weak non-cooperation. In particular, the fraction of trustees who choose to cooperate is 
not statistically significantly different between the threat and no threat cases, at 30% and 
25%, respectively.  
It is worth emphasizing again that these results do not vary with investor 
intentions. The fraction of trustees who return nothing when threatened with weak 
sanctions is about 43% and 50% in the intentions and random conditions, respectively, 
and the difference is not statistically significant (p=0.58). Also, 72% of trustees cooperate 
when intentionally threatened with severe sanctions, while 65% do so when the severe 
sanction is imposed randomly by nature, and this difference is not significant (p=0.59). 
 
IV.3.b. Five-alternative model 
To further examine this effect on weak non-cooperation, we estimated a multinomial 
logit on a refined action space that includes five alternatives. There are three non-
cooperation options: completely defect (send nothing), partially defect (return a positive 
amount less than the transfer amount), reciprocate (return at least as much as the transfer 
amount but less than the requested amount); and two cooperative options: cooperate 
                                                 
10 Unless otherwise noted, all p-values reported below correspond to two-sided, two-sample t-tests, 
assuming unequal variances, of the null hypothesis that the means are the same. 
  20(return exactly the requested amount) and strong cooperate (return more than the 
requested amount).
11
Table 5 details the estimation results, and the underlying data are plotted in Figure 
5. Note first that the frequency of strong cooperation is not statistically significantly 
affected by the threat of sanctions in either the high or low desired back transfer 
conditions. In the low case the frequencies are 12.2 and 14.9 with and without threats, 
respectively, while those frequencies are 5.3 and 4.6, respectively, for the high desired 
backtransfer case. Strong cooperation, as we have defined it, cannot be enforced by the 
sanctioning mechanism, and this might be a reason that its frequency does not vary with 
sanction threats. Also, we saw above that rates of complete defection with low desired 
backtransfer do not respond much to sanction threats, and because defection is defined 
the same way in this analysis the same is true here. Similarly, cooperation rates are not 
sensitive to weak sanction threats (p=0.55): 20.0% of trustees return exactly the requested 
amount when weak sanctions are not threatened, and 24.6% do so when they are.   
Figure 4 indicated that threats of sanctions have a strong affect on the frequency 
of weak non-cooperation. Figure 5 refines this, and suggests that “reciprocity” (returning 
at least the investment amount but less than the requested amount) is substantially 
affected by threats in both the low and high desired back transfer condition. In the former 
case, the frequency of reciprocation is 17% and 0% in the no threat and threat conditions, 
respectively, and this difference is statistically significant (p=0.01). Similarly, in the 
weak punishment condition the change is from 27.7% to 5.3%, and again statistically 
significant (p<0.01).  
Severe punishment also has an effect on the decision to return a positive amount 
that is less than the transferred amount: this is chosen by 40.4% of trustees in the low 
desired back transfer condition, but only 8.2% do so after being threatened with a severe 
sanction. This change is statistically significant (p<0.01.) There is not a significant effect 
                                                 
11 It occurs a few times in our data that the desired back transfer is less than the transfer amount, meaning 
that a "cooperative" subject would in this case still return less than the transfer amount. In those few 
ambiguous cases we assigned the subject's decision to the most cooperative potential alternative. Our 
results are robust to dropping these observations, or to classifying them differently. 
 
  21on this choice when the threat is weak: the frequency of this choice changes from 23% to 
19% as a result of imposing threats of weak punishment (p=0.61). 
Taken together, one interpretation of these findings is as follows. First, about 20% 
of trustees are dogmatic defectors who will send back nothing, and another 20% are 
dogmatic cooperators who will return the requested amount or more. These dogmatic 
decisions are insensitive to the presence of sanctions (or intentions).
12 The remaining 
60% of trustees will make a return decision that is sensitive to whether sanctions have 
been threatened, and whether a threatened sanction is severe or weak. If punishment is 
not threatened, then roughly half of those 60% of trustees will return an amount at least 
as great as the investment amount, but less than the amount that the investor requested, 
and the remaining half will return a positive amount that is less than the investment 
amount.  If, on the other hand, trustees are threatened with a severe sanction, then most of 
those sanction-sensitive 60% will choose to return exactly the requested amount. 
However, if that 60% are threatened with a weak sanction, then instead of allocating their 
return decisions roughly equally between reciprocation and partial defection, about half 
will instead choose to send back nothing, and most of the other half will choose to return 
a positive amount less than the investment amount.   
 
IV.4. Comments on Unfair Backtransfer Request Data 
There were 45 investors in our sample who requested an unfair backtransfer. As pointed 
out above, an “unfair” request is one for more than 2/3 of the tripled transfer amount. 
Table 1(B) shows that these requests are not balanced across cells: In the majority of 
these cases the unfair request was combined with a threat of a sanction. In the intention 
treatment we observed only four cases out of 27 where an unfair backtransfer request did 
not include the threat of punishment. It turns out that two-thirds (12 of 18) of the unfair 
requests in the incentive treatment were assigned to the sanction condition.  
  Although the sample size is small, there are nevertheless several features of this 
data worth noting. First, there were five cases where the investor chose to send one and 
                                                 
12 The fact that the rates are insensitive does not necessarily imply that 40% of trustees are insensitive to 
our experiment’s sanction incentives. However, Kurzban and Houser (2004, forthcoming), and 
Gunnthorsdottir et. al. (2001), among others, have found evidence from public goods experiments that 
subjects do differ systematically in their propensities to cooperate. At least in that environment, some 
subjects are dogmatic cooperators while others are dogmatic defectors.  
  22ask for all three back. All of these cases occurred in the “intention” treatment, and in all 
cases the investors combined these decisions with a sanction threat. Because the sanction 
amount is four, the income-maximizing choice for the corresponding trustees is to send 
back the entire requested amount. Four of the five trustees did exactly this, and one sent 
back nothing. Table 1(B) provides statistics that include and do not include these five 
cases.    
  Second, after excluding the five “dominant strategy” cases just mentioned, one 
can compare means over the remaining 18 cases where punishment was intentional to the 
12 cases where it was not. A casual inspection of the second and fifth columns of Table 
1(B) reveals that behavior is not very different in those cases, indeed all pairwise tests 
reveal it to be identical. Again with the caveat that the sample size is small, we find that it 
is incentives, not intentions, which seem to be responsible for any sanction effect. 
  Consistent with Fehr and Rockenbach (2003), we find evidence that sanctions 
have a detrimental effect on cooperation. One can quickly see from Table 1(B), again 
excluding the dominant strategy cases and after pooling the intention and incentive 
treatments, that the amount returned when fines are imposed is about 14% and 12% of the 
desired back transfer and tripled transferred amounts, respectively.  In the event that fines 
are not imposed these numbers are 29% and 25%, respectively.   
 
V. Concluding Discussion 
Threats of punishment are commonly used to encourage cooperation. Yet a substantial 
amount of cross-disciplinary research, and certainly casual observation, reveals that 
credible threats of punishment sometimes fail to foster cooperation. Both “intention” and 
incentive effects have been variously cited as reasons that punishment can fail. One goal 
of this research was to shed new light on the relative roles of incentives and intentions in 
reducing punishment’s efficacy in a personal exchange environment. Moreover, because 
there are often a variety of ways in which one can behave non-cooperatively, our research 
also characterized differences in non-cooperative behavior among various incentive and 
intention conditions.   
  We reported data from human subjects who made decisions in a novel extension 
of an experiment reported by Fehr and Rockenbach (2003). We found that credible 
  23threats often fail to produce cooperative behavior. This failure was not the result of 
intention effects: the effects of threats on trustworthiness did not depend on whether the 
threats were made intentionally by an investor or imposed randomly by nature. In 
particular, we found that trustees were statistically significantly more likely to return 
nothing to their investors after being threatened with weak punishment, regardless of 
whether the threat was made by the investor. This is consistent with the view that 
extrinsic incentives, regardless of how they are imposed, can crowd out internal 
incentives and, consequently, change subjects’ cognitive frame from ethical to income 
maximizing (for related findings see, e.g. Kreps, 1997, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997;  
Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b).
13  
Trustees’ decisions were substantially affected by the severity of the imposed 
punishment. We found that whether to choose severe punishment presents something of a 
dilemma for investors: using it provided a higher expected return but with increased 
variance. Weak punishment, on the other hand, somewhat reduced trustees’ average 
return amounts, and statistically significantly increased the variance of the return 
distribution. Accordingly, threats of weak punishment are risky. A useful implication of 
this result is that, when designing sanctioning systems, policy makers need to consider 
not only the expected effect on cooperation, but also take into account the way non-
cooperative behavior might be changed in the face of the new incentive structure, perhaps 
especially in the event that the threatened sanctions are weak.   
Everyday examples of weak sanctioning systems are plentiful, and include fines for 
parking too long or not removing snow from sidewalks quickly enough. This might seem 
to call into question the external validity of our results. After all, if threats of weak 
sanctions are risky, and if people are generally risk averse, then one might expect 
evolutionary selection effects to diminish the use of weak sanctions over time. In fact, 
there are many reasons one might expect to see stable weak sanctioning systems in the 
naturally occurring world. One is that severe punishment is often not credible, because 
                                                 
13 Convergent evidence of this effect is provided by ex post questionnaires that we administered to subjects 
after the experiment had concluded. These questionnaires, which were voluntary and not saliently 
rewarded, asked subjects why they made the decisions they did. Our casual examination of their responses 
suggested that it was common for trustees who were not threatened with sanctions to report that “guilt 
avoidance” was an important reason to return money to the investor. This sentiment was far less frequent in 
those cases where sanctions had been imposed. Regardless of whether the threat was intentional, threatened 
trustees were much more likely to say they made their decisions based on earnings considerations. 
  24people expect officials will be unwilling to enforce extremely severe sanctions for minor 
violations. Moreover, even if a strong sanction is credible, it can be very expensive to 
enforce due to costs incurred in, for example, building and defending a case. Weak 
sanctions create the politically expedient impression that “something is being done” 
while at the same time having the great practical benefits of being both credible and 
relatively low cost to administer. And the difficulty in conducting counterfactual analyses 
can make the risks of weak sanction systems very difficult to quantify, or even detect. 
Of course, one can point to examples of weak sanctioning systems that have been 
replaced. A prominent example of a large, complex and now abandoned weak 
sanctioning system is the Federal Communication Commissions’ (FCC’s) procedures to 
enforce indecency regulations. In principle, the FCC has always had the power to warn, 
sanction, suspend or even revoke the license of broadcasters who violate decency statutes. 
As a practical matter though, the FCC has never in its 75 year history suspended or 
revoked any station’s broadcast license. Although the FCC did occasionally impose 
sanctions, they were infrequent and relatively low cost. For example, in 2000 the FCC 
levied exactly seven sanctions, for a total of $48,000, in response to complaints regarding 
indecent programming. Applied to this environment, our findings would suggest that 
broadcasters who found it in their financial best interest to violate the sanctions would 
systematically and repeatedly do so. Perhaps in part for this reason, the FCC has recently 
moved to replace the weak sanctioning system with one that makes credible threats of 
very severe sanctions. During the first seven months of 2004 the FCC levied over $1.5 
million in new fines (Solomon, 2004).  
This research focused on an environment where subjects made anonymous 
decisions exactly once. Consequently, our results cannot inform the way in which an ex-
ante commitment to punish impacts the evolution of cooperation in repeat play. Does 
repeat play obscure the distinction between commitment and opportunity where punishers 
elect to offer cooperation on the next trial after punishing defection?  Or does the ex ante 
commitment to punish spoil the reinforcement of cooperation in repeat interaction by 
creating a more “hostile” environment? In addition to a laboratory analysis geared 
towards those questions, future research might be profitably directed towards, for 
example, investigating satellite or internet radio broadcasters’ programming decisions. 
  25Satellite programming competes directly with FCC regulated broadcasts, but is itself 
neither licensed by nor subject to the regulations of the FCC.  This could provide ideal 
complementary natural experiments on sanction effects. 
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  29Appendix A: The Model and Statistical Procedure 
 
We model the trustee as making one choice among five mutually-exclusive alternatives. 
The three-alterative model also discussed in the body of the text can be developed 
analogously.
14 Of course, a trustee’s action space includes more than five alternatives. 
Consequently, although both defensible and robust to reasonable changes, the mapping 
between subjects’ actions and our model’s alternatives is unavoidably arbitrary.  
 
As described in the body of the text, the five alternatives we consider are (i) defect, (ii) 
partially defect, (iii) reciprocate, (iv) cooperate and (v) strongly cooperate. Each of the 
subjects’ possible actions maps into a unique alternative in the model except in the 
empirically rare case where an investor requests a back-transfer that is not greater than 
the original transfer amount. This happens three times in our data when the investor sends 
zero (leaving the trustee with no choice to make), and two additional times when the 
transfer is non-zero. We have eliminated all of the cases where the trustee had no choice 
to make. In the two other cases the subject returned back exactly what the investor 
requested, and we have coded these subjects as cooperative. Our results do not change if 
we change their coding or drop them from the data set.  
 
We model subjects’ choices among these alternatives within a random utility model 
framework. An advantage of our procedure is that it is robust to the way in which we 
order alternatives. It is worthwhile to point out that it is inappropriate to use an ordered 
(e.g., ordered probit or ordered logit) framework to analyze these data. The reason is that 
there is no obvious way to order our model’s alternatives. In particular, both the amount 
sent and amount requested determine the categorization of an individual’s return 
decision, and it is not obvious how to map this two dimensional set to the real line. This 
is important because, in contrast with a random utility model, standard ordered 
frameworks include only one stochastic dimension. Consequently, there exist cross-
alternative restrictions (on the way changes in one alternative’s probability affect 
another’s probability) that depend critically on the specific ordering chosen. While in 
many analyses it can be efficient to impose such restrictions, in our case it is not 
reasonable to report results about, for example, the effect of punishment on cooperation 
that rely heavily on the fact that defect is first and cooperation fourth on our list.      
 
Our simple random utility model is developed as follows. We assume that the utility 
benefit for subject i in session   of each choice   can be modeled as a function of the 
nine-vector 
s j
ij x  (whose elements are described in the body of the text) and a stochastic 
component  isj ε  that depends on the individual, the session and the alternative. Letting β  
denote a real nine-vector, we then have:   
 
  ' isj ij isj Ux β ε = + .  
 
                                                 
14 Note that the three-alternative model is not a subset of the five-alternative model. The mapping between 
subjects’ actions and the model’s alternatives differs between the two cases. 
  30Subject i is assumed to choose alternative  ' j  if and only if   for all  ' isj isj UU > '. j j ≠  We 
assume that  isj ε  and  ''' isj ε  follow independent Weibull distributions whenever   and 
when   and   We allow for the possibility, however, that the error components 
are not independent among subjects within the same session.  
', ss ≠
' s = s '. ii =
 
These assumptions imply a standard multinomial logit framework, where the standard 
errors of our estimates are calculated using a White (1980) procedure that is robust to 




  31Appendix B1: Instructions for the Intention Treatment 
 
I. Investor’s instruction 
You are Actor 1 
Description of Your Decision Problem 
 
Thank you for coming! You’ve earned $5 for showing up on time, and the instructions 
explain how you can make decisions and earn more money. So please read these 
instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have 
a question please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
You are in Room A and you will be randomly paired with someone in Room B. You 
will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. 
Similarly, your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. You are 
in the role of Actor 1 and your matched participant is in the role of Actor 2. You and 
Actor 2 will participate only once in this decision problem. You make your decisions 
with the help of the decision sheet described below. 
 
This is how the experiment works. 
 
Endowment 
Besides the $5 show-up bonus, at the beginning of the experiment both actors receive an 
initial endowment of 10 E$ (experimental dollars).  
 
Your decision 
Your decision includes three parts: 
1.   A transfer between 0 and 10 E$ to Actor 2. 
You, as Actor 1, can transfer, from your endowment, any amount between 0 and 10 E$ to 
Actor 2. The experimenters will triple this transferred amount, so that Actor 2 receives 
three times the amount of E$ you transferred. 
 
2.  A desired back-transfer. 
You also make a decision about your desired back-transfer, that is, at least how many E$ 
you would like to receive back from Actor 2. You can ask for any amount between zero 
and the tripled amount of your transfer. 
 
3.  Whether to impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 E$ on Actor 2’s final earnings. 
• A conditional payoff cut of 4 E$ for Actor 2 has the following consequences. 
The payoff of Actor 2 will be reduced by 4 E$ if his/her actual back-transfer 
is less than your desired back-transfer. The conditional payoff cut does not 
happen if Actor 2 transfers your desired amount or more to you. 
• If you choose not to impose a conditional payoff cut, then the income of 
Actor 2 will not be reduced, irrespective of the amount of Actor 2’s back-
transfer. 
 
The decision of Actor 2  
  32After your decision, Actor 2 can transfer back to you any amount of the tripled number of 
E$ bills he/she received. In case that you have chosen a conditional payoff cut of 4 E$, 





You (Actor 1) receive: 10 E$ – transfer to Actor 2 + back-transfer from Actor 2. 
 
Actor 2 receives: 10 E$ + 3 × transfer from Actor 1 – back-transfer to Actor 1 – 4 E$ ( in 
case that a conditional payoff cut was imposed and is due)         
                 
Exchange rate: For every E$ you earn you will be paid $1. 
 
How the experiment is conducted 
 
There are several envelopes in Room A and Room B.  In each envelope in Room A and 
Room B, there is a card marked with a unique letter.  Each envelope looks the same. 
Everyone in both Room A and Room B will randomly pick up an envelope.  The person 
in Room B who chooses the card with the same letter as yours will be your Actor 2.  
 
Items on your table:  10 E$ bills (your endowment), two decision sheets (one for Actor 1 
and one for Actor 2) and two Yes/No stickers.  
Items on Actor 2’s table: 10 E$ bills (Actor 2’s endowment) 
 
You will make your decisions at your seat by filling in the decision sheets.  You need to 
leave the number of E$ bills you want to transfer in the envelope, but keep the card, 
which will help the experimenter to return the envelope to you later.  Raise your hand 
after you’re done.  The experimenter will go to your seat, check whether all necessary 
information is on the decision sheets, then triple your transferred E$ bills. The 
experimenter will also record the letter of your card on the back of the decision sheets so 
that your envelope can be given to your Actor 2 who has the card with the same letter.  
The experimenter will then put the decision sheets and tripled amount of E$ bills in your 
envelope and collect it.  After every Actor 1 has finished, the experimenter will take all 
the envelopes to Room B.   
 
The experimenter will give each Actor 1’s envelope to his/her Actor 2. Each Actor 2 then 
decides how much to transfer back to you by writing down a number on the decision 
sheets and leave the E$ bills he/she wants to transfer back to you in the envelope. When 
Actor 2 has finished his/her decision, the experimenter will go to his/her seat, check 
whether all the necessary information is on the decision sheets and then put your copy of 
the decision sheet in the envelope.  Actor 2 will keep his/her copy of the decision sheet. 
 
After all Actor 2s have finished, the experimenter will take all the envelopes to Room A.  
The experimenter will return to you the envelope with the back-transfer E$ bills from 
Actor 2 inside.  Each Actor 1 will then be called, one by one, to the experimenter. When 
  33called, you will take your envelope to the experimenter. The experimenter will calculate 
your final earnings and pay you privately. Then please exit the lab.  Since you will be 
asked to leave when you are done, you should take all your belongings when you go to 
the experimenter. Actor 2s in room B will be paid after all Actor 1s have been paid and 
have left the lab.  
 
Throughout this experiment, you won’t meet any Actor 2 in room B. 
 
End of Instructions 
 
Please raise your hand to indicate that you are finished reading these instructions. 
When you do, an experimenter will give you a short quiz to ensure that you 
understand how you make decisions.  
 
II. Trustee’s instruction 
 
You are Actor 2 
Description of Your Decision Problem 
 
Thank you for coming! You’ve earned $5 for showing up on time, and the instructions 
explain how you can make decisions and earn more money. So please read these 
instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have 
a question please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
You are in Room B and you will be randomly paired with someone in Room A. You 
will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. 
Similarly, your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. You are 
in the role of Actor 2 and your matched participant is in the role of Actor 1. You and 
Actor 1 will participate only once in this decision problem. You make your decisions 
with the help of the decision sheet described below. 
 
This is how the experiment works. 
 
Endowment 
Besides the $5 show up bonus, at the beginning of the experiment both actors receive an 
initial endowment of 10 E$ (experimental dollars).  
 
The decision of Actor 1 ( You are not Actor 1) 
First Actor 1 has to make a decision that consists of the following three components. 
4.   A transfer between 0 and 10 E$ to you. 
Actor 1 can transfer, from his/her endowment, any amount between 0 and 10 E$ to you. 
The experimenters will triple this transferred amount, so that you receive three times the 
amount of E$ transferred by Actor 1. 
 
5.  A desired back-transfer. 
  34Actor 1 will indicate his/her desired back-transfer, which is at least how many E$ he/she 
would like to receive back from you. Actor 1 can ask for any amount between zero and 
the tripled amount of his/her transfer. 
 
6.  Whether to impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 E$ on your final earnings. 
• A conditional payoff cut of 4 E$ has the following consequences for you. 
Your payoff will be reduced by 4 E$ if your actual back-transfer is less than 
the back-transfer desired by Actor 1. The conditional payoff cut does not 
happen if you transfer the desired amount or more to Actor 1. 
• If Actor 1 chooses not to impose a conditional payoff cut, then your income 
will not be reduced, irrespective of the amount of your back-transfer to Actor 
1. 
 
Your decision  
After Actor 1 makes his/her decisions, you, as Actor 2, can transfer back to Actor 1 any 
amount of the tripled number of E$ bills you received. As noted, in case that Actor 1 has 
chosen a conditional payoff cut of 4 E$, and you transfer back less than what he/she 




Actor 1 receives: 10 E$ – transfer to Actor 2 + back-transfer from Actor 2. 
 
You (Actor 2) receive: 10 E$ + 3× transfer from Actor 1 – back-transfer to Actor 1 – 4 
E$ ( in case that a conditional payoff cut was imposed and is due)         
                 
Exchange rate: For every E$ you earn you will be paid $1. 
 
How the experiment is conducted 
 
There are several envelopes in Room A and Room B.  In each envelope in Room A and 
Room B, there is a card marked with a unique letter.  Each envelope looks the same. 
Everyone in both Room A and Room B will randomly pick up an envelope.  The person 
in Room A who chooses the card with the same letter as yours will be your Actor 1.  
 
Items on your table: 10 E$ bills (Your endowment).  
Items on Actor 1’s table: 10 E$ bills (Actor 1’s endowment), two decision sheets (one for 
Actor 1 and one for Actor 2, as shown below) and two Yes/No stickers. 
 
Sample Decision Sheets 
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Decision Sheet                     Copy for Actor 1  Decision Sheet                     Copy for Actor 2 
Actor 1:  Actor 1: 
1. I decide to transfer ________E$ to Actor 2  1. I decide to transfer ________E$ to Actor 2 
2. My desired back-transfer amount: ______E$  2. My desired back-transfer amount: ______E$ 
3. If Actor 2’s back-transfer is less than my desired   3. If Actor 2’s back-transfer is less than my desired  
    back-transfer amount,  I will impose a conditional 
payoff cut of 4 E$ on Actor 2: 
    back-transfer amount,  I will impose a conditional 
payoff cut of 4 E$ on Actor 2: 
   
Yes                                 No  Yes                                 No 
   
Actor 2:  Actor 2: 
Based on Actor 1’s decision, I decide to transfer 
______ E$ back to Actor 1 
Based on Actor 1’s decision, I decide to transfer 
______ E$ back to Actor 1 
   
Actor 1 will make his/her decision at his/her seat by filling in the decision sheets.  Actor 
1 will leave the number of E$ bills he/she wants to transfer in the envelope he/she picked 
up, but keep the card, which will help the experimenter to return the envelope to him/her 
later.  When Actor 1 is done,  the experimenter will go to his/her seat, check whether all 
necessary information is on the decision sheets, then triple the transferred E$ bills. The 
experimenter will also record the letter of his/her card on the back of the decision sheets 
so that his/her envelope can be given to his/her Actor 2 who has the card with the same 
letter.  The experimenter will then put the decision sheets and tripled number of E$ bills 
in his/her envelope and collect it.  After every Actor 1 has finished, the experimenter will 
take all the envelopes to Room B.   
The experimenter will give each of you your Actor 1’s envelope. When you get 
the envelope, decide how much to transfer back to Actor 1 by writing down a number on 
the decision sheets and leave the E$ bills you want to transfer back to Actor 1 in the 
envelope.  Raise your hand when you are done. The experimenter will go to your seat, 
check whether all the necessary information is on the decision sheets and then put Actor 
1’s copy of the decision sheet in the envelope and collect it.  You will keep your copy of 
the decision sheet. Don’t show anybody else your decision sheet.  
After all Actor 2s have finished, the experimenter will take all the envelopes to 
Room A.  The experimenter will return to Actor 1 his/her envelope with the back-transfer 
E$ bills from Actor 2 inside.  Each Actor 1 will be called, one by one, to the 
experimenter. The experimenter will calculate his/her final earnings and pay him/her 
privately. Then Actor 1 will exit the lab. After all Actor 1s have left, the experimenter 
will call each Actor 2 one by one.  When called, you will go to the experimenter with 
your decision sheet. The experimenter will calculate your earnings and pay you privately. 
 
Throughout this experiment, you won’t meet any Actor 2 in room B. 
 
End of Instructions 
 
Please raise your hand to indicate that you are finished reading these instructions. 
When you’re done, an experimenter will give you a short quiz to ensure that you 
understand how you make decisions.  
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I. Investor’s instruction 
You are Actor 1 
Description of Your Decision Problem 
 
Thank you for coming! You’ve earned $5 for showing up on time, and the instructions 
explain how you can make decisions and earn more money. So please read these 
instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have 
a question please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
You are in Room A and you will be randomly paired with someone in Room B. You 
will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. 
Similarly, your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. You are 
in the role of Actor 1 and your matched participant is in the role of Actor 2. You and 
Actor 2 will participate only once in this decision problem. You make your decisions 
with the help of the decision sheet described below. 
 
This is how the experiment works. 
 
Endowment 
Besides the $5 show-up bonus, at the beginning of the experiment both actors receive an 
initial endowment of 10 E$ (experimental dollars).  
 
Your decision 
Your decision includes two parts: 
1.   A transfer between 0 and 10 E$ to Actor 2. 
You, as Actor 1, can transfer, from your endowment, any amount between 0 and 10 
E$ to Actor 2. The experimenters will triple this transferred amount, so that Actor 2 
receives three times the amount of E$ you transferred. 
 
2.  A desired back-transfer. 
You also make a decision about your desired back-transfer, that is, at least how 
many E$ you would like to receive back from Actor 2. You can ask for any amount 
between zero and the tripled amount of your transfer. 
 
The decision of Actor 2  
After your decision, Actor 2 can transfer back to you any amount of the tripled number of 




You (Actor 1) receive: 10 E$ – transfer to Actor 2 + back-transfer from Actor 2. 
                 
Exchange rate: For every E$ you earn you will be paid $1. 
 
  37How the experiment is conducted 
 
There are several envelopes in Room A and Room B.  In each envelope in Room A and 
Room B, there is a tag marked with a unique letter.  Each envelope looks the same. 
Everyone in both Room A and Room B will randomly pick up an envelope.  The person 
in Room B who chooses the tag with the same letter as yours will be your Actor 2.  
 
Items on your table:  10 E$ bills (your endowment), two decision sheets (one for Actor 1 
and one for Actor 2).  
Items on Actor 2’s table: 10 E$ bills (Actor 2’s endowment) 
 
You will make your decisions at your seat by filling in the decision sheets.  You need to 
leave the number of E$ bills you want to transfer in the envelope, but keep the tag, which 
will help the experimenter to return the envelope to you later.  Raise your hand after 
you’re done.  The experimenter will go to your seat, check whether all necessary 
information is on the decision sheets, then triple your transferred E$ bills. The 
experimenter will also record the letter of your tag on the back of the decision sheets so 
that your envelope can be given to your Actor 2 who has the tag with the same letter.  
The experimenter will then put the decision sheets and tripled amount of E$ bills in your 
envelope and collect it.  After every Actor 1 has finished, the experimenter will take all 
the envelopes to Room B.   
 
Each Actor 2 will get his/her Actor 1’s envelop according to the letter on their tags. Each 
Actor 2 then decides how much to transfer back to you by writing down a number on the 
decision sheets and leave the E$ bills he/she wants to transfer back to you in the envelope. 
When Actor 2 has finished his/her decision, the experimenter will go to his/her seat, 
check whether all the necessary information is on the decision sheets and then put your 
copy of the decision sheet in the envelope.  Actor 2 will keep his/her copy of the decision 
sheet. 
 
After all Actor 2s have finished, the experimenter will take all the envelopes to Room A.  
The experimenter will return to you the envelope with the back-transfer E$ bills from 
Actor 2 inside.  Each Actor 1 will then be called, one by one, to the experimenter. When 
called, you will take your envelope to the experimenter. The experimenter will calculate 
your final earnings and pay you privately. Then please exit the lab.  Since you will be 
asked to leave when you are done, you should take all your belongings when you go to 
the experimenter. Actor 2s in room B will be paid after all Actor 1s have been paid and 
have left the lab.  
 
Throughout this experiment, you won’t meet any Actor 2 in room B. 
 
End of Instructions 
 
Please raise your hand to indicate that you are finished reading these instructions. 
When you do, an experimenter will give you a short quiz to ensure that you 
understand how you make decisions.  
  38 
I. Trustee’s instruction 
 
You are Actor 2 
Description of Your Decision Problem 
 
Thank you for coming! You’ve earned $5 for showing up on time, and the instructions 
explain how you can make decisions and earn more money. So please read these 
instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have 
a question please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
You are in Room B and you will be randomly paired with someone in Room A. You 
will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. 
Similarly, your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. You are 
in the role of Actor 2 and your matched participant is in the role of Actor 1. You and 
Actor 1 will participate only once in this decision problem. You make your decisions 
with the help of the decision sheet described below. 
 
This is how the experiment works. 
 
Endowment 
Besides the $5 show up bonus, at the beginning of the experiment both actors receive an 
initial endowment of 10 E$ (experimental dollars).  
 
The decision of Actor 1 ( You are not Actor 1) 
First Actor 1 has to make a decision that consists of the following two components. 
7.   A transfer between 0 and 10 E$ to you. 
Actor 1 can transfer, from his/her endowment, any amount between 0 and 10 E$ to you. 
The experimenters will triple this transferred amount, so that you receive three times the 
amount of E$ transferred by Actor 1. 
 
8.  A desired back-transfer. 
Actor 1 will indicate his/her desired back-transfer, which is at least how many E$ he/she 
would like to receive back from you. Actor 1 can ask for any amount between zero and 
the tripled amount of his/her transfer. 
 
The randomly determined Conditional Payoff-Cut 
 
Half of the Actor 2s will be randomly assigned to receive the Payoff-Cut and half 
randomly assigned not to receive the Payoff-Cut.   
• If you are randomly assigned to the Payoff-Cut, there will be a conditional 
payoff cut of 4 E$ for you. A conditional payoff cut has the following 
consequences: Your payoff will be reduced by 4 E$ if your actual back-
transfer is less than Actor 1’s desired back-transfer. The conditional payoff 
cut does not happen if you transfer the desired amount or more to Actor 1.  
  39• If you are randomly assigned to No Payoff-Cut, then your earnings will not 
be reduced, irrespective of the amount of your back-transfer. 
 
Important:  
(1) Actor 1s have not been told about the conditional payoff cut. When Actor 1s 
make their transfer and desired back-transfer decisions, they don’t know 
that some Actor 2s will be assigned to a conditional payoff-cut.  
 
(2) Whether you are assigned to the Payoff-Cut is randomly determined. 
Nothing that you or Actor 1 does affects whether you are assigned to the 
Payoff Cut. Each Actor 2’s assignment is indicated by the Payoff-Cut sticker 
and No Payoff-Cut sticker (as explained below). 
 
(3) At the end of the experiment, after all decisions have been made, Actor 1s will 
be informed about the Payoff-Cut, and will be told whether their matched 
Actor 2s were randomly assigned to the Payoff-Cut. 
 
 
Your decision  
After Actor 1 makes his/her decisions, and after whether you are assigned to the 
conditional payoff-cut has been randomly determined, you, as Actor 2, can transfer back 
to Actor 1 any amount of the tripled number of E$ bills you received. As noted, in case 
that you are assigned to the conditional payoff cut of 4 E$, and you transfer back less 




Actor 1 receives: 10 E$ – transfer to Actor 2 + back-transfer from Actor 2. 
 
You (Actor 2) receive: 10 E$ + 3× transfer from Actor 1 – back-transfer to Actor 1 – 4 
E$ (in case that a conditional payoff-cut is due).         
                 
Exchange rate: For every E$ you earn you will be paid $1. 
 
How the experiment is conducted 
 
There are several envelopes in Room A and Room B.  In each envelope in Room A and 
Room B, there is a tag marked with a unique letter.  Each envelope looks the same. 
Everyone in both Room A and Room B will randomly pick up an envelope.  The person 
in Room A who chooses the tag with the same letter as yours will be your Actor 1.  
 
Items on your table: 10 E$ bills (Your endowment).  
Items on Actor 1’s table: 10 E$ bills (Actor 1’s endowment), two decision sheets (one for 
Actor 1 and one for Actor 2, as shown below). 
 
Sample Decision Sheets 
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Decision Sheet                     Copy for Actor 1  Decision Sheet                     Copy for Actor 2 
   
Actor 1:  Actor 1: 
1. I decide to transfer ________E$ to Actor 2  1. I decide to transfer ________E$ to Actor 2 
2. My desired back-transfer amount: ______E$  2. My desired back-transfer amount: ______E$ 
   
Actor 2:  Actor 2: 
I decide to transfer ______ E$ back to Actor 1  I decide to transfer ______ E$ back to Actor 1 
   
   
 
Actor 1 will make his/her decision at his/her seat by filling in both of the decision sheets.  
Actor 1 will leave the number of E$ bills he/she wants to transfer in the envelope he/she 
picked up, but keep the tag, which will help the experimenter to return the envelope to 
him/her later.  When Actor 1 is done, the experimenter will go to his/her seat, check 
whether all necessary information is on the decision sheets, then triple the transferred E$ 
bills. The experimenter will also record the letter of his/her tag on the back of the 
decision sheets so that his/her envelope can be given to his/her Actor 2 who has the tag 
with the same letter.  The experimenter will then put the decision sheets and tripled 
number of E$ bills in his/her envelope and collect it.  After every Actor 1 has finished, 
the experimenter will take all the envelopes to Room B.   
 
In Room B, the experimenter will first randomly choose half of the envelopes. For each 
envelope, the experimenter will take out both Decision sheets, and put a Payoff-Cut 
sticker (as shown below) on both decision sheets and put it back into the envelope. 
Similarly, for the other half of the envelopes, the experimenter will put No Payoff-Cut 
sticker on both decision sheets.  
 









Randomly Determined Payoff-Cut  
 
If Actor 2’s back-transfer is less than Actor 1’s 
desired  back-transfer amount,  there will be a 
conditional payoff cut of 4 E$ on Actor 2: 
                 Yes 
 
Randomly Determined Payoff-Cut  
 
If Actor 2’s back-transfer is less than Actor 1’s 
desired  back-transfer amount,  there will be a 
conditional payoff cut of 4 E$ on Actor 2: 
                 No 
After the conditional payoff-cut has been randomly assigned, the experimenter will give 
each Actor 2 his/her Actor 1’s envelope. When you get the envelope, the sticker on the 
decision sheets will tell you whether you have been randomly assigned to the conditional 
payoff-cut. Based on this and Actor 1’s decision, you will decide how much to transfer 
back to Actor 1.  You will write the amount you want to transfer on both decision sheets, 
and also place the E$ bills you want to transfer to Actor 1 in the envelope.   
 
  41Raise your hand when you are done. The experimenter will go to your seat, check 
whether all the necessary information is on the decision sheets and then put Actor 1’s 
copy of the decision sheet in the envelope and collect it.  You will keep your copy of the 
decision sheet. Don’t show anybody else your decision sheet.   
 
After all Actor 2s have finished, the experimenter will take all the envelopes to Room A.  
The experimenter will explain the Conditional Payoff Cut to the Actor 1s at this time. 
This is the first time that Actor 1s will learn about the Payoff Cut. The experimenter will 
return to Actor 1 his/her envelope with the decision sheet and the back-transfer E$ bills 
from Actor 2 inside. Each Actor 1 will be called, one by one, to the experimenter. The 
experimenter will calculate his/her final earnings and pay him/her privately. Then Actor 1 
will exit the lab. After all Actor 1s have left, the experimenter will call Actor 2s one by 
one.  When called, you will go to the experimenter with your decision sheet. The 
experimenter will calculate your earnings and pay you privately. 
 
Throughout this experiment, you won’t meet any Actor 1 in room A. 
 
End of Instructions 
 
Please raise your hand to indicate that you are finished reading these instructions. 
When you’re done, an experimenter will give you a short quiz to ensure that you 





  42Table 1.  (A) Mean decisions by investors and trustees when request is fair* 
Random Treatment  Intention Treatment 
















Desired back-transfer as a 

















Actual back-transfer as a 









Actual back-transfer as a 









Number of observations  52 pairs  44 pairs  60 pairs  62 pairs 
 
 (B) Mean decisions by investors and trustees when request is unfair 
Random Treatment  Intention Treatment 
















Desired back-transfer as a 





















Actual back-transfer as a 











Actual back-transfer as a 











Number of observations  6 pairs  12 pairs  4 pairs  23 pairs  18 pairs 
*Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
**Here investors transfer one, request three back and impose the fine of four.  There are 
five observations in this case. Of these, one trustee returned zero and four returned three. 
  43Table 2: Effect of Intentions and Incentives on 
              Percentage of Tripled Investment Amount Returned by Trustees 
Variables Coefficient 
High investment(=1 investment≥4;=0, o.w)  -7.55 
(5.25) 
Intention threat  28.51 
(6.83) 
Random threat  31.06 
(8.10) 
Intention no threat  35.28 
(6.56) 
Random no threat  39.22 
(6.24) 
Random threat and low request  13.39 
(11.11) 
Intention threat and low request  18.52 
(7.19) 
Intention no threat and low request  -4.22 
(7.02) 




Numbers in parentheses are standard errors;  
Low request: desired back transfer<8 and Higher request: desired backtransfer ≥ 8 
 





(Return≥Request)  Variables 
Coefficient Coefficient 






































Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
Baseline: Weakly non-cooperate (0<Return<Request) 
 
























2    0.1125 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  













(Return>Request)   
Variables 
Coefficient        Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient


































Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Baseline: Completely defect (Return=0) 
 
 
  47Figure 1 






































Let L denote “Low Request,” H denote “High Request,” N=”Not Threatened,” 
T=”Threatened,” R=”Random” and I=”Intention.” Then the number of trustee 
observations in each cell is as follows. LRN=22, LIN=25, LRT=20, LIT=29,  HRN=30, 
HIN=35, HRT=24, HIT=33.   
  48Figure 2 
 






























































































Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of the respective distributions. 
  49Figure 3 
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(27.8) 




  50Figure 4 
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  51Figure 5 
  






























Low Request  High Request 
  52